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Abstract 
Far right actors use the Internet for myriad purposes, such as forming communities, sharing 
information and attracting support. Concerns have been raised about their use of social media 
to spread hateful messages by both academics and policymakers. Given the potentially 
dangerous effects of hate speech, which can inflict harm on targeted victims, create a sense of 
fear amongst communities and pollute civic discourse, there is a pressing need to understand 
at a granular level how it manifests amongst far right actors online. In this paper we investigate 
the dynamics of Islamophobia amongst followers of a far right political party on Twitter, the 
British National Party (the BNP). Using a new dataset of 5.2 million tweets, collected over a 
period of one year, we identify 7 distinct trajectories of Islamophobia, which capture 
heterogeneity in users’ behaviour. The 7 trajectories reflect qualitative, quantitative and 
temporal differences in users’ behaviour. We analyse the data using a classifier for 
Islamophobic content (which distinguishes between None, Implicit and Explicit 
Islamophobia), and latent Markov modelling with k-modes clustering. The findings provide a 
new level of granular insight into Islamophobic behaviour amongst the far right on social 
media. They both deepen existing knowledge and inform policy discussions regarding how far 
right extremism and hate speech can be analysed and tackled. We make our dataset of 5.2 
million tweets publicly available.1 
Keywords: Far right, Islamophobia, hate speech, social media, latent markov modelling, 
Twitter, the BNP. 
 
Introduction 
Far right actors were early adopters of digital technologies in the early 2000s [1]–[3] and have 
since used the Internet for myriad purposes, including forming communities [4]–[6], building 
international alliances [7]–[9], sharing information and broadcasting messages [1], [10], and 
organising and attracting support [2], [10]–[12]. In particular, social media has been widely 
 
 
 
1 Data will be released on publication of the final article. 
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adopted by the far right actors as it offers them the opportunity to bypass traditional media 
‘gatekeepers’ and access very large audiences [13], [14]. Despite this growing body of research 
into far right politics online, relatively little attention has been paid to how digital far right 
actors produce and share hateful content.  
The BNP (founded in 1982) is a far right party in the UK, founded in the early 1980s. Its 
electoral successes have challenged the widely held view that the UK is a case of ‘far right 
failure’ [15]. During the 2000s several BNP councillors and a London assembly member were 
elected, as well as two Members of the European Parliament in 2009. However, since the late 
2000s, the party has suffered setbacks as the far right landscape has diversified and the party 
has faced internal troubles and legal proceedings [13], [16]. Its longstanding leader, and one-
time MEP, Nick Griffin received considerable media exposure during the early 2010s in 
mainstream TV programs and national newspapers [17], [18], but was replaced in 2015 by the 
little-known Adam Walker. At the 2010 general election the BNP received 563,743 votes or 
1.9% of the total (although no BNP Members of Parliament were elected due to Britain’s first 
past the post system); in 2015, it received just 1,667 votes. However, determining the true level 
of support for the BNP is difficult given that its constituency of potential or ‘latent’ supporters 
may be far greater than its number of actual voters and party members [19]. The BNP remains 
an important focus of far right research it has much in common with other far right groups, 
many of whom also are unlikely to achieve electoral success in the near future but have 
considerable impact within the far right landscape and rely heavily on social media. This 
includes many of the newer, less public and less organisationally stable groups, such as 
Generation Identity, the ‘Casuals’ and National Action. 
Xenophobic nationalism, or ‘nativism’, is widely viewed as a constitutive feature of the 
contemporary far right, alongside populism and authoritarianism [20]–[22]. Many minority 
groups have received prejudicial abuse from far right parties; the BNP has been variously 
described as racist [23], anti-Semitic [24], homophobic [25], anti-Immigrant [26] and sexist 
[27]. Since the the 9/11 Islamist terrorist attacks in America, many far right groups have 
directed their prejudice against Muslims [28]–[30]. As Zúquete puts it, ‘the threat that the 
Crescent will rise over the continent and the spectre of a Muslim Europe have become basic 
ideological features and themes of the European extreme right’ [31]. This is evidenced by far 
right narratives online. Awan describes how the English Defence League ‘us[es] social 
networking sites like Twitter to post malicious statements […] promoting online hate’ [32, p. 
145] and elsewhere, with Zempi, writes that the far right ‘exploit the virtual environment and 
world-wide events to incite hatred towards Islam and Muslims’ [33]. Several studies also show 
how far right groups use online spaces to create deeply affective anti-Muslim discursive frames 
[34]–[36]. However, whilst there is consensus that Islamophobia is a core part of the 
contemporary far right’s ideology and discourse, existing research provides competing 
accounts of how such behaviour manifests online. 
Much of the traditional ‘offline’ literature suggests that Islamophobia will manifest fairly 
evenly online as, in many studies, the far right is treated as a homogenous block of like-minded 
prejudiced individuals. For instance, Trilling describes supporters of the BNP as ‘bloody nasty 
people’ [37] and Biggs and Knauss use membership of the BNP as a proxy for holding 
prejudicial beliefs [38]. Similarly, in a review of research into the far right, Rydgren describes 
the ‘ethnic competition thesis’ as a key explanation of voting for far right parties because ‘even 
if not all voters who hold anti-immigration attitudes vote for a new radical right-wing party, 
most voters who do vote for such parties hold such attitudes’ [39, p. 250]. This position is 
supported by Golder in a subsequent review, who discusses how ethnic competition drives far 
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right support through economic and cultural grievances [22, pp. 483–485]. These arguments 
have some support within online-specific research. In a measurement study, Chandrasekharan 
et al. suggest that all of the content posted by members of certain banned subreddits, including 
r/fatpeoplehate and r/CoonTown, is toxic [40]. Awan also describes how far right actors use 
social media ‘to inflame religious and racial tensions’ by creating ‘walls of hate’ [41]. These 
accounts suggest that most far right actors are deeply and vocally prejudiced individuals. 
At the same time, other studies suggest that the far right is far more heterogeneous. Research 
into far right voters suggests they can be motivated by economic deprivation and a desire to 
‘protest’ against  mainstream parties [42], [43]. Qualitative investigations of far right 
supporters also suggest that many have myriad motivations for joining far right parties, and 
sometimes express ambiguous views on immigration and ethnic outgroups [44]. Reflecting on 
the fluctuating and dispersed nature of the online far right, Ganesh argues that it should be 
conceptualized as a ‘swarm’, comprising members with constantly shifting allegiances, 
priorities and levels of commitment [8]. He proposes that the far right is not a single fixed 
entity but a complex set of loosely affiliated individuals who are attracted to far right 
organisations for a range of reasons rather than a single goal of spreading hate.  
Research into the dynamics of online hate more broadly suggest that how it manifests varies 
across users, time, context and geography [45]. For instance, in a study of Islamophobic tweets 
sent during 2016/2017, researchers at DEMOS found that of all the hateful tweets they 
collected ~15% were sent by 1% of the users and 50% were sent by just 6% [46]. Alrababa et 
al. investigate the role of celebrities in reducing prejudice amongst followers of football clubs 
on Twitter, and find that the prevalence of Islamophobic tweeting can drop substantially after 
individuals are exposed to positive celebrity role models [47]. Burnap and Williams also show 
that online hate follows temporal dynamics, exhibiting peaks and troughs around contentious 
events, such as terrorist attacks [48], [49].  
At present, there is a lack of evidence regarding how Islamophobic behaviour manifests 
amongst far right actors on social media. Partly, this is because much previous work has 
focused on the prejudicial attitudes amongst far right actors rather than prejudicial behaviours. 
Behaviours and attitudes are not necessarily concomitant and may have a complex relationship 
with each other.  There is a  pressing need for research which refines our understanding of far 
right behaviour on social media, and which can be used to inform appropriate policy responses. 
To address this research gap, we investigate the dynamics of Islamophobia amongst followers 
of the BNP on Twitter over a period of one year, using a newly collected dataset of 5.2 million 
tweets. 
 
Data and Methods 
 
Data 
All tweets sent by followers of the BNP’s Twitter account (@bnp) were collected from 1st April 
2017 to 1st April 2018. This period covers several important political events in the UK, 
including the General Election on 8th June 2017, Local Elections on 4th May 2017, Manchester 
Arena bombing on 22nd May 2017, London Bridge terror attack on 3rd June 2017 and the 
progression of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act of 2018 through the UK parliament. 
Tweets are collected using Twitter’s Search API, which allows a maximum of 3,200 tweets to 
be collected from each user’s timeline (including retweets). We collect data on a weekly basis 
and, as such, only miss tweets from users who exceed this high weekly limit. 
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At the start of the period (1st April 2017) there were 13,002 followers of the BNP and at the 
end (31st March 2018) there were 13,951. Of the original 13,002 users, 11,785 (90.6%) were 
still followers at the end (1,217 ceased following). Given that it is easy to start and stop 
following accounts on social media, often indicating a lack of genuine interest, we only include 
users in the dataset who follow the BNP across the entire period. 5,310 of these 11,785 users 
(45%) tweet at least once during the period. We remove tweets which are sent in languages 
other than ‘English’ or ‘Undetermined’. This reduces the number of users by 68 to 5,242. 
We remove bots, which are defined as accounts who send more than 40 tweets per day on 
average. This is based on the work of Kollanyi et al., who consider accounts which post at least 
50 times per day to be highly automated [50]. Kollanyi et al.’s cutoff of 50 is arbitrary, and 
some bot-owners have responded to limits by setting their bots to tweet just below the limits.2 
As such, we opt for a lower threshold of 40 tweets per day per user (14,600 in total during the 
period studied). This approach can be understood as a way of removing high-activity users, 
including both bots and genuine users with idiosyncratic or semi-automated tweeting patterns 
[51]. 114 users meet this bot-detection criterion and are removed.3 This reduces the number of 
users to 5,128. The datasets consists of 5,221,256 tweets. 
 
Measurement of Islamophobia 
Islamophobia is a deeply contested term, with many competing definitions available [52]–[54]. 
Bleich’s definition of Islamophobia has been widely adopted: ‘indiscriminate negative 
attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims’ [55]. It is well-suited to the study of social 
media content and is easily operationalized for empirical research. We use a machine learning 
classifier to detect Islamophobia, which assigns tweets to one of three classes on an ordinal 
scale: None, Implicit and Explicit Islamophobia. The Explicit/Implicit distinction is widely 
used in other research detecting abusive content online [56] and enables granular insight into 
the different ways in which Muslims, and Islam, are associated with negative traits [57]. The 
classifier is described further in [58] and more information is available in the Methods 
appendix.  
 
Latent Markov modelling 
Latent Markov (LM) modelling is an extension to the traditional Markov chain model. It 
assumes the existence of K latent states, where K must be defined in advance [59]. The LM 
model then estimates both the behaviours associated with each latent state, the transitional 
 
 
 
2This point was made to one of the authors by Sam Woolley, one of the authors of the 
Kollanyi et al. paper, in a private conversation. 
3We repeat all of our analyses on the full dataset, without any users removed for high volume 
tweeting, and report similar results. 
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probabilities between states and the state which each user is assigned to in each time period. 
Parameters are estimated using maximum likelihood estimation via the expectation-
maximization algorithm [60]. We fit our model with time homogeneous transitional 
probabilities (i.e. the transition probabilities are constant over all time periods). 
Studying users’ behaviour on Twitter longitudinally is difficult because users tweet at different 
times. As such, the actual timestamps of tweets cannot be used as this would create a LM model 
with millions of different ‘events’, few of which line up with each other. One solution is to 
measure tweets within a pre-defined time window, such as 1 day. However, this risks 
introducing considerable biases because users send different volumes of tweets over time (i.e. 
on some days the volume of tweets is high and on others it is low). As such, we scale the time 
period by the total number of tweets (5,221,256). This is divided into 100 periods, each of 
which consists of 52,213 tweets. The amount of linear time that each time period covers range 
from 1.7 days to 8.7 days. This approach is counter-intuitive but ensures that (i) for each user, 
the number of time periods without a value is minimized and (ii) users are compared across the 
same time intervals; tx covers the same time period for every user – it is just that the linear 
length of tx is not the same as the linear length of tx+1. Given that the choice of 100 periods is 
arbitrary, we run our models with 10, 25 and 50 time periods and report similar results. Details 
of model fitting for the LM model are given in the Methods appendix. 
For the LM model, we measure Islamophobia for each user in each time period by taking just 
the highest class of tweeting they exhibit. This utilizes the three levels of the ordinal 
Islamophobia variable, assigned by the classifier: None, Implicit and Explicit Islamophobia. 
For instance, if a user sends at least one tweet that is Explicit Islamophobic during tx then that 
is how their behaviour is characterised in tx. If they send at least one Implicit Islamophobic 
tweet but no Explicit tweets then their behaviour is characterised as Implicit. It is only 
characterised as None if they send no Implicit or Explicit tweets. This strategy ensures that 
Islamophobic tweets are well represented in the LM model. It is also theoretically robust since 
what is of greatest interest is whether users have engaged in Islamophobic behaviour rather 
than whether, for instance, the majority of their behaviour is Islamophobic. Finally, even 
though we use a varying time period scaled by the overall volume of tweets, some users do not 
send any tweets in some time periods. Rather than treating time periods when users do not 
tweet as missing, we assign them a value of None Islamophobic.  
 
Results 
 
Prevalence of Islamophobia 
Of the 5.2 million tweets in the dataset, 4.4 million are non-Islamophobic (83.8%), 0.57 million 
are Implicitly Islamophobic (10.8%) and 0.28 million are Explicitly Islamophobic (5.3%). 
Surprisingly, twice as much of the Islamophobia expressed by followers of the BNP is Implicit 
(i.e. subtle and nuanced) rather than Explicit (i.e. aggressive and overt). This is shown in Figure 
1(a). The prevalence of Islamophobia fluctuates considerably during the period studied. There 
are several peaks, most noticeably at the start when several terror attacks took place. Previous 
research indicates these are likely to drive spikes in online hate, and may explain some of the 
variation observed here [48]. The prevalence of Islamophobia over time across the whole 
cohort of users is shown in Figure 1 (b).  
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Figure 1, (a) Prevalence of Islamophobic tweets within 5.2 million tweet dataset, (b) 
Prevalence of Islamophobic tweets over time for all users in cohort. 
The distribution of tweets per user is long-tailed, as shown in Figure 2(a). The maximum 
number of tweets is curtailed at 14,600 because during the sampling process high volume 
tweeters are removed. The distribution of Islamophobic tweets per user (combining Implicit 
and Explicit) is shown in Figure 2(b) and is also long-tailed. The Gini coefficients for the 
distribution of Implicit Islamophobia among users is 0.812, Explicit Islamophobia is 0.803, 
and both combined is 0.822. The Gini coefficient for the distribution of all tweets is very 
similar, 0.806. Overall, a small number of users are responsible for most of the Islamophobic 
tweets in the dataset. Figure 2(c) shows the number of Islamophobic tweets versus the total 
number of tweets sent by each follower.  
 
Figure 2, (a) Distribution of all tweets for all users in cohort, (b) Distribution of Islamophobic 
tweets (implicit and explicit combined) for all users in cohort, (c) Scatter plot of the number 
of Islamophobic tweets against the total number of tweets per user. In (c) axes are 
logarithmic and users who do not send any Islamophobic tweets (n = 1,484) are not shown. 
These analyses suggest that the overall prevalence of Islamophobia reported in Figure 1(a) 
offers only a very coarse characterisation of users’ behaviour. Figure 1(b) shows that there are 
considerable variations over time and Figure 2 that there are variations in terms of how much 
Islamophobia each user sends, both as an absolute value and as a proportion of the total number 
of tweets sent (see Figure 2(c)). Taken together, these findings suggest that patterns of 
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Islamophobic behaviour are highly heterogeneous, and that time is likely to be an important 
aspect for understanding how users differ. For instance, some users may follow the overall 
temporal trend shown in 2(b) whilst others will diverge from it. These variations are 
investigated further in the next section. 
 
Trajectories of Islamophobic hate 
To investigate variations in users’ behaviour over time we identify and investigate distinctive 
trajectories in the data. A trajectory can be understood as a typified pattern of behaviour 
followed by a subset of users in the cohort over time. It is akin to a pathway, as has been widely 
examined in studies of terrorism [61], and a customer journey, as studied in business and 
management studies [62]. To model the existence of trajectories, we fit an LM model with K 
= 3 over the 100 time periods, each of which comprises a fixed interval of 52,213 total tweets 
sent (see Data and Methods). Based on initial exploratory analyses, we separate two groups of 
users before fitting this model: those who send only None Islamophobic tweets (n = 1,484) and 
those who send only None and Implicit Islamophobic tweets (n = 718). The LM model is fit 
on the  remaining users (n = 2,926), all of whom send tweets across the three classes of None, 
Implicit and Explicit Islamophobia . 
The three latent states in the LM model reflect different propensities to engage in each type of 
tweeting. State 1 has a 0.95 probability of None Islamophobic and low probabilities for both 
Implicit and Explicit Islamophobia (0.03 and 0.02): when users are in this latent state they are 
overwhelmingly likely to not engage in any Islamophobia. State 2 is the most evenly distributed 
across the three types, with probabilities which range from 0.22 to 0.45: users in this latent 
state will exhibit highly varied behaviour. State 3 has a 0.81 probability for Explicit 
Islamophobia, 0.13 for Implicit and just 0.06 for None: users in this latent state are highly likely 
to send an Islamophobic tweet, particularly an Explicit one. These probabilities are shown in   
Table 1.  
Table 1, Behavioural probabilities for latent states 
Islamophobia State 1 State 2 State 3 
None 0.95 0.45 0.06 
Implicit 0.03 0.32 0.13 
Explicit 0.02 0.22 0.81 
TOTAL 1 1 1 
Each state has a transitional probability, which captures how likely users are to either stay in 
the same state or move states. These are shown in Table 2. The probabilities are all very high 
for staying in the same state (0.95 to 0.99). However, interestingly, users in State 3 are more 
likely to shift back to State 1 and 2 than users are to switch into State 3 (there is a probability 
of 0.95 of staying in State 3 whilst there is a probability of 0.99 of staying in State 1). Given 
that State 3 is most strongly associated with Explicit Islamophobic behaviour, and State 1 with 
None Islamophobic behaviour, this suggests that users are more likely to engage in Explicit 
Islamophobic behaviour and then return to None Islamophobic than the opposite way round: 
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Explicit Islamophobic tweeting is a less stable behaviour compared with None Islamophobic 
tweeting.  
Table 2, Transitional probabilities for latent states 
 
State at ti+1 
1 2 3 
St
at
e 
at
 t i
 
1 0.99 0.01 0.00 
2 0.03 0.96 0.01 
3 0.02 0.03 0.95 
 
The LM model provides a simplified representation of the underlying data, in which each user 
is represented as a vector of length 100 (in line with the 100 time periods), each value of which 
is a latent state. We cluster these vectors using the k-modes clustering algorithm. Through 
fitting to minimize within sum of squares, and manual inspection, we identify that five clusters 
are optimal (see the Methods appendix). Each of the five clusters represents a distinct 
trajectory; users are assigned to just one and cannot move between them. In addition, there are 
2 further trajectories, which comprise the two groups separated at the start: (1) users who send 
only None Islamophobic tweets (n = 1,484) and users who send only None and Implicit 
Islamophobic tweets (n = 718). As such, we identify a total of 7 trajectories within the entire 
cohort of users.  
To analyse the differences between trajectories, and to account for the underlying trend in the 
data shown in Figure 1(b), we calculate a metric called Trajectory Score (TScore). For each 
cohort, in each time period, we take the average number of tweets for each type of tweeting 
(None, Implicit and Explicit Islamophobia) and divide by the average number of tweets across 
the whole cohort. This is shown in Equation 1, where p is the time period, l is the type of 
tweeting, U is the number of users, u is each user, T is the trajectory, and n is the number of 
tweets.  
Equation 1 𝜇"# = 	∑ 𝑛("#)(*+𝑈  𝑇"# = 	∑ 𝑛("#).(*+𝑈/  𝑇𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒"# = 5𝑇"#𝜇"#	6 	× 	100 
TScore can be interpreted as a coefficient where 100 indicates the trajectory is in line with the 
average of the whole cohort and any other value is a multiple of the cohort average. For 
instance, a value of 25 for Implicit Islamophobia indicates that users in this trajectory send 
25% of the average amount of Implicitly Islamophobic tweets across the whole cohort. A value 
of 200 indicates that 200% of the average has been sent. There is no seasonality to account for 
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with this metric because we split the data into 100 periods based on the number of tweets rather 
than linear time (see Error! Reference source not found.).  
The behavioural patterns of the 7 trajectories are shown in Figure 3. In each panel, the average 
prevalence of tweeting across the whole cohort (for each time period and within each type of 
tweeting) is depicted by the horizontal grey dashed line, which is at a constant of 100. We name 
the seven trajectories: None, Very Low, Low, High, Very High, Escalating and De-escalating. 
The seven trajectories capture differences in the volume of tweets which users send, the 
strength of those tweets, and their temporality, and are described in Table 3. Noticeably, we do 
not identify a Moderate trajectory as none of the trajectories has a TScore which is consistently 
close to 100. 
 
Figure 3, TScores for the 7 trajectories of Islamophobia over the 100 time periods of 52,213 
tweets. The grey dotted line shows the average tweeting for the entire cohort. Scales are free 
to vary.   
The TScores for five of the seven trajectories (None, Very Low, Low, High and Very High) 
are broadly stable over time, with only very weak trends observed (i.e. for Low the TScores 
decrease slightly over time and for Very High they slightly increase). These trajectories 
primarily capture differences in the prevalence of tweeting, but also reveal some qualitative 
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differences. For instance, the Very High trajectory is the only one in which the TScore for 
Implicit and Explicit Islamophobia is greater than the TScore for None. This indicates that 
users in this trajectory engage in more Islamophobic behaviour both in absolute terms and as a 
proportion of their total behaviour. The relationship between Implicit and Explicit 
Islamophobic tweeting differs. For Low, the TScores are closely aligned, for High, the TScore 
for Implicit is greater than for Explicit, and for Very High the TScore for Explicit is greater 
than Implicit. The consistency of users’ behaviour also varies between trajectories. The High 
trajectory has greater variance over time than the Low and Very High trajectories. This suggests 
these users are more susceptible to exogenous shocks, which could be driving short-term 
changes. The Escalating and De-escalating trajectories differ from the other trajectories 
because the users show a clear change in behaviour. For both Implicit and Explicit 
Islamophobia, the TScores for the Escalating trajectory start from below average (~30) and 
finish far above (~170). In contrast, in the De-escalating trajectory the TScores for Implicit and 
Explicit tweeting are high at the start (~240) and far lower at the end (~40). This analysis shows 
that the trajectories are a useful way of identifying quantitative, qualitative and temporal 
differences between users.  
Table 3, Descriptions of the 7 trajectories of Islamophobia 
Name Description 
None Users who never engage in any form of Islamophobia (whether Implicit or Explicit). 
Very Low Users who engage in very little Implicit Islamophobia and no Explicit Islamophobia. 
Low Users who engage in both Implicit and Explicit Islamophobia, far below the average level. 
High Users who consistently engage in an above average level of Implicit and Explicit Islamophobia. 
Very High Users who consistently engage in a high level of Islamophobia and are comparatively more likely to engage in Explicit. 
Escalating Users whose Islamophobia is increasing over time. 
De-escalating Users whose Islamophobia is decreasing over time. 
 
Quantitative differences between the trajectories are shown in Figure 4, which depicts the mean 
and dispersion of the number of each type of tweets for each trajectory. The figures are 
provided in the Methods appendix. The differences between the trajectories are highly 
statistically significant. We conduct non-parametric omnibus tests of statistical significance: 
ANOVA type, Wilks’ Lambda type, Lawley Hotelling type and Bartlett Nanda Pillai type, as 
well as permutation variations [63]. These are all statistically significant (p < 0.000001). We 
further verify this with Kruskall-Wallis tests on each of the three types of tweeting. In all cases, 
the differences are statistically significant (p < 0.000001). We then conduct pairwise Wilcoxon 
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rank sum tests on each pair of trajectories, and all differences are significant (p < 0.000001). 
These results provide strong evidence that differences between trajectories are significant. 
 
Figure 4, The mean and dispersion of each type of tweeting (None, Implicit and Explicit) for 
the 7 trajectories of Islamophobia. 
The number of users in each trajectory varies considerably, as shown in Figure 5. The most 
prevalent is None, which accounts for 28.9% of users. Very Low comprises 14.0%. It is 
plausible that many of the users in these trajectories (total, 42.9%) are less committed to far 
right politics. They may be followers of other political parties, journalists or academics. The 
Low trajectory comprises a further 27.0% of users. The two most concerning trajectories are 
the users in High and Very High (9.2% and 8.8% respectively); these 18.0% are perpetually 
engaging in considerable levels of Islamophobia. Finally, the two trajectories with the most 
noticeable temporal trends, Escalating and De-escalating, comprise 4.8% and 7.4% 
respectively. There are 50% more De-escalating compared to Escalating users. The greater 
proportion of De-escalating most likely reflects the fact that several Islamist terrorist attacks 
occurred at the start of the period, which might have motivated some users to send many 
Islamophobic tweets in response [49].  
 
Figure 5, The number and percentage of users assigned to each of the 7 trajectories of 
Islamophobia. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
We have investigated the dynamics of Islamophobia amongst followers of the BNP on Twitter 
and have identified seven distinct behavioural trajectories, which capture quantitative, 
qualitative and temporal differences in users’ behaviour. Our results offer a new way of 
understanding and characterising the far right which can, in turn, be used inform future areas 
of research, such as investigating the causes and self-perception of far right actors. Overall, our 
findings support the view that the followers of the BNP on Twitter comprise a shifting, complex 
assemblage of individuals, as proposed by Ganesh’s concept of the ‘swarm’, rather than just a 
homogenous group of ‘bloody nasty people’, as proposed by Trilling. We anticipate that other 
far right groups, on other platforms, might exhibit different behavioural trajectories and that 
the prevalence of those trajectories is likely to differ. Nonetheless, we anticipate that the key 
argument would hold; the far right is not a single homogeneous group of Islamophobes, which 
can be easily represented through summary statistics, but a heterogeneous mix of individuals, 
exhibiting many different behavioural trajectories. These findings could be generalised by 
identifying trajectories across different types of hate, such as xenophobia, racism and 
homophobia. They can also be used to increase understanding of the dynamics of Islamophobia 
on social media more widely, including amongst followers of other political parties and non-
political users. To enable future researchers to use and develop our findings, we have made the 
ID strings of our 5 million tweet dataset publicly available. 
This work not only contributes to empirical knowledge but also informs policy discussions 
regarding how to tackle the rise of far right extremism and online hate. First, the results show 
that platforms, such as Twitter, need to adopt a more holistic approach which focuses on the 
behavioural patterns of users rather than just single bits of content. Second, the results could 
be used by policymakers to prioritise how resources to counter hate speech and provide support 
to victims should be allocated. Resources should be allocated to reflect the differing challenges 
posed by the infrequent and more nascent Islamophobia expressed by users in the Low 
trajectory compared with the constant and aggressive Islamophobia expressed by users in Very 
High. Third, this research could provide a more nuanced way of planning and targeting 
interventions against hateful users. Users in different trajectories may respond differently to 
available policies, such as bans, filters and demonetisation and counter-speech. Finally, fourth, 
the Escalating and De-escalating trajectories present opportunities for policymakers to both 
better understand and tackle far right extremism. Further research would benefit by 
investigating why these individuals change their behaviour and, in the case of the Escalating 
trajectory, developing ways of intervening at an early stage. Potentially, an advanced predictive 
model could flag users who are likely to escalate at an early stage in the process and ethical 
efforts could be made to address their actions. These policy implications could be evaluated 
further in future work, such as by investigating a more diverse range of online spaces, including 
niche platforms like 8chan, Discord and some communities on Reddit, to see whether similar 
behavioural patterns are observed. 
There are several limitations of the current research. The LM model is fit on a simplified 
representation of the data, comprising just the strongest expression that each user tweets in 
each time period. As such, the volume of tweets is not modelled directly. Nonetheless, the 
model performs well at capturing differences in not only the strength but also the volume of 
Islamophobic tweets. This is because there is an underlying association between the two, which 
the LM model picks up on as we fit a reasonably large number of time periods (100). In the 
future, this could be included addressed through using, for instance, a continuous multivariate 
LM model. Evaluating performance with an unsupervised method is inherently difficult, as 
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many standard evaluative metrics, such as the R2, cannot be calculated. The results presented 
here indicates the existence of several distinct trajectories, which have been verified by 
statistical significance testing. Future work should aim to increase the robustness of the 
modelling and to verify the findings. A further area of investigation is whether these 
behavioural differences we observe between trajectories align with attitudinal differences, as 
these are not necessarily concomitant. Investigating the extent to which these are associated 
would require a larger multi-methodological research design to verify. 
This research provides a new way of characterising far right actors online and also directly 
informs policy discussions around how their hateful behaviour can be tackled. Using a mixture 
of social and computational sciences, our primary contribution is to identify the internal 
heterogeneity of the far right and establish the need for more nuanced assessments of far right 
behaviour online. 
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Trajectories of Islamophobia | 
Appendix 
1. Islamophobia classifier 
The classifier for Islamophobic content is described in detail in (Vidgen & Yasseri 2018). It 
was trained on a newly annotated dataset of 4,000 tweets and achieves balanced accuracy of 
0.83 and a micro-F1 score of 0.78 when tested on an unseen 300 tweet dataset. Precision is 
0.78, which is far above the 0.7 minimum recommended by van Rijsbergen for empirical 
research [64]. The main sources of classification error are (1) confusing implicit and explicit 
Islamophobia and (2) confusing non-Islamophobic with implicit Islamophobic, specifically 
content which (a) discusses Muslims and Islam but in a non-hateful way and (b) is hateful 
against another target, such as immigrants or minority ethnic groups. Overall, the classifiers’ 
performance compares well with other ternary multi-class classifiers for abusive content and 
is suitable for empirical research [65], [66].  
The Implicit/explicit Islamophobia distinction in the classifier is analytical and does not capture 
moral distinctions or directly inform whether statements should be considered permissible on 
social media platforms, given the protections afforded to freedom of expression. Consider a 
news report about Islamist terrorist activity, e.g. ‘Muslim terrorist attacks London bridge’. On 
the one hand, this is a factual statement. On the other, it frames Muslims in a negative way by 
associating them with a reviled trait, terrorism. Speakers may have myriad motivations in 
making this statement; they may want to report a news event of nationwide significance, spread 
negative views about Muslims and thereby stir opposition, or use it as a starting point to discuss 
multicultural integration. Irrespective of these differing intentions, all have served the same 
purpose: to reproduce a negative framing of Muslims. 
 
2. Latent Markov model fitting 
LM models are tested for 1 to 12 latent states and evaluated with AIC and BIC. Both measures 
are closely aligned and indicate that a range of between 3 and 7 latent states is optimal, as 
shown in Figure 6. Fitting a number of latent states towards the top-end of the indicated range 
(e.g. 5 to 7) is problematic because each latent state accounts for a specific range of behaviours. 
Because the states are highly tailored to small subsets of users, it is less likely that users will 
transition between states. As such, the transitional probabilities become very high for 
remaining in the same state. For instance, in a model with 5 latent states, the transitional 
probabilities for remaining in the same state are all over 0.98. This makes it harder for the 
models to capture longitudinal changes in behaviour. As such, we set K to a value at the lower 
end of the range (K = 3). 
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Figure 6, Results of fitting the optimal number of latent states in the LM model, using AIC 
and BIC. 
3. Number of clusters: k-modes fitting 
From the output of the LM model, we test for between 2 and 20 clusters with the k-modes 
algorithm (referred to as ‘trajectories’ in the main body of the paper), evaluated by measuring 
the Within Sum of Squares. The results indicate a range of between 5 and 8 clusters is optimal. 
This is shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7, Results of fitting for the optimal number of trajectories, using Within Sum of 
Squares. 
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4. Quantitative differences between the 7 trajectories 
Table 4, Quantitative differences in None, Implicit and Explicit Islamophobic tweeting 
between the 7 trajectories of Islamophobia. 
 None Implicit Explicit All 
Trajectory Mean Standard deviation Mean 
Standard 
deviation Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Total 
number of 
tweets 
None 28 (100%) 139 0 (0%) 0 0 (0%) 0 28 
Very Low 128 (97%) 266 3 (3%) 7 0 (0%) 0 131 
Low 263 (94%) 541 12 (4%) 32 6 (2%) 13 281 
High 2,137 (89%) 2,240 182 (8%) 223 70 (3%) 119 2,389 
Very High 4,762 (79%) 3,084 844 (14%) 692 439 (7%) 386 6,045 
Escalating 1,140 (90%) 1,335 92 (7%) 166 37 (3%) 77 1,269 
De-escalating 1,211 (83%) 1,668 160 (11%) 271 83 (6%) 144 1,454 
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